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ABSTRACT
       This paper assembles new data and new methods for studying wealth inequality trends in
industrializing America.  Records of household heads from the census matched with real and
personal property tax records for Massachusetts reveal that the Theil entropy measure of inequality
approximately doubled over the period from 1820 to 1910, a gain that was divided about evenly
between the antebellum and the postbellum periods.  A surge between 1870 and 1900 dominated the
growth in inequality following the Civil War.  Decompositions of changes in the Theil entropy
measure reveal that during both periods, inequality was increasing due to the shift of the population
out of rural areas and agriculture into urban areas where wealth was less equally distributed.  But the
increases in inequality were also due to increasing inequality within population groups.  Between
1870 and 1910, inequality was growing within occupations, age groups, and the native-born
population.  Proposed labor market explanations, including sectoral shift that led to higher wages
in non-agricultural relative to agricultural sectors, biased technological change, and immigration are
inconsistent with the fact that inequality between occupational groups was declining in the last
decades of the century.  Wealth accumulation patterns by age are also inconsistent with the
hypothesis of child default on responsibilities for old age care, at least during the second half of the
nineteenth century.  To explain the salient facts, we are led to propose a new explanation based on
luck, rents and entrepreneurship.
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  Economic, social, and political historians have long studied the distributions of income 
and wealth because inequality affects economic growth via savings, investment, and incentives 
for taking entrepreneurial risks.  The degree of inequality within and across groups also identifies 
the distribution of economic rewards, which is an important factor governing influence in social 
and political processes.   
Patterns of inequality from wealth or income data are reasonably well established for 
three eras in American history:  the late 1700s, the mid-nineteenth century, and from 
approximately 1920 onward.
1  After surveying the available evidence two decades ago, Jeffrey 
Williamson and Peter Lindert concluded that inequality increased from the late 1700s through 
the second quarter of the twentieth century and declined thereafter.
2  In their judgment, much of 
the nineteenth-century trend toward greater inequality occurred with the onset of 
industrialization, in the four decades prior to the Civil War.  They described the period between 
the Civil War and the Great Depression as an “uneven plateau” during which inequality 
remained high but exhibited no long-term trend.  They recognized, however, that additional 
evidence on the distribution of wealth and income during this period was sorely needed.
3  
                                                 
1 Simon Kuznets, Shares, and Robert Lampman, Share, pioneered the study of inequality trends 
in this century using federal income tax records and federal estate tax data.  Lee Soltow, Men 
and Wealth, and others anchored inequality estimates for the mid-nineteenth century in 
household wealth reported by the federal censuses of 1850, 1860, and 1870.  Soltow, 
Distribution, also examined inequality using real estate appraisals from the First Direct Tax of 
1798.  Alice Hanson Jones, Wealth, and the Mains, “Inequality,” and Social, developed and 
refined probate records as a source for the late Colonial and early national period.  For a recent 
survey of the literature see Lindert, “Three Centuries.” 
2 Williamson and Lindert, American Inequality. 
3 Ibid, p. 43.  Lee Soltow, “Inequalities,” however, has argued that inequality did not increase 
significantly during the nineteenth century.    2  
This paper develops and analyzes new data on long-term trends in inequality from 1820 
to 1910—nearly 10,000 male household heads listed in the manuscript schedules of the census 
matched with real and personal property tax records from Massachusetts.  This state was by far 
the largest within industrializing New England.  It was also at or near the center of industrial 
change in the region, which included the structural shift out of agriculture, the growth of the 
textile industry, rapid urbanization, immigration, and out-migration—all factors thought to have 
had effects on the distribution of wealth in the industrializing Northeast. 
We investigate trends in wealth inequality using measures widely used by economists in 
the inequality literature:  the shares of wealth held by the top fractiles of the wealth distribution, 
the Gini coefficient, and the Theil entropy measure.  The Theil entropy measure is particularly 
useful because its changes over time can be decomposed into components representing the 
effects of shifting population shares, changes in the relative mean wealth of different population 
sub-groups, and changes in within-group inequality. 
 
Data 
Although a separate paper has been published on our data source, for the convenience of 
readers we begin with a brief description of the evidence, which is new to the literature on long-
term trends in inequality.
4  Real and personal property taxes formed the backbone of state and 
local tax revenues until income and sales taxes were introduced in the twentieth century.  
According to Richard T. Ely, the antebellum period “witnessed the complete establishment of the 
American system of state and local taxation.  The distinguishing feature is … the taxation of all 
                                                 
4 See Steckel, “Census Manuscript Schedules,” which gives details on sampling procedures, 
additional characteristics of the sample, detailed definitions of occupations, collection of taxes, 
and comparisons with wealth reported by the censuses of 1850, 1860, and 1870.   3  
property, moveable and immovable, visible and invisible, real and personal, as we say in 
America, at one uniform rate.”
 5  The similarity of the tax bases in the states is made clear from 
digests of taxation.
6  Legislation created assessors, boards of equalization, and other machinery 
to collect taxes.  Reevaluations were made at irregular intervals but ownership lists of taxable 
property typically were prepared every year, not merely at the time of reevaluations.  State 
governments operated through local authorities (county or town) to conduct the assessments and 
maintain the tax lists of individuals.  In 1796 the list of ratable property in Massachusetts was “so 
long as to include almost everything.”
7  All real and personal property not specially exempted 
was subject to taxation.  Real estate included land and buildings, and personal estate included 
goods, chattels, money and effects (wherever they were); ships; money at interest; public stocks 
and securities; stocks in turnpikes, bridges, and moneyed corporations, in or out of state.  
Property exempted from taxation included household furniture not exceeding $1000 in value, 
wearing apparel, farming utensils, and mechanics' tools up to the value of $300.
8 
The manuscript schedules of federal population census became more elaborate and 
comprehensive during the nineteenth century.
9  Through the census of 1840, census schedules 
listed the name of each household head and reported the number of household members in 
different demographic groups defined by sex, age, and race.  Starting with the 1850 census, the 
schedules listed each individual by name and reported each individual’s age, sex, color, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5 Ely, Taxation, p. 131. 
6 Street, Digest and Plehn, Revenue Systems. 
7 Ely, Taxation, p. 138. 
8 Bullock, “Taxation;” Nichols, Taxation. 
 
9 Wright, History.   4  
other characteristics such as occupation.  The 1850 census listed occupations for males over 15, 
the value of real estate owned, and place of birth.  The 1860 schedules added personal property 
and occupations for females, and the 1870 schedules added the nativity of one's father and 
mother.  Beginning in 1880, the schedules dropped wealth but added questions on 
unemployment, relationship to the household head, and the birthplaces of one’s parents. 
10  The 
schedules for 1900 and 1910 added questions on the year of immigration to the U.S., ability to 
speak English, and home ownership. 
  Following a survey of the available tax records, samples were taken from localities that 
had a complete set of records over the period 1820 to 1910.  The sample for Massachusetts 
includes Boston, Salem, Lexington, Westminster, and Sturbridge.  In each census year, 
approximately 1,200 households were randomly chosen from each of the urban and the rural 
areas of these townships.  All information available for each household was recorded from the 
census manuscript schedules.   
  The tax records were maintained in alphabetical order of the taxpayer by ward in cities or 
by town or township in rural areas.  The census manuscript schedules were alphabetized 
accordingly to facilitate the search for a match.  If a household head was not found in the tax 
records, it was assumed that he or she had no taxable property.  This assumption may lead to 
errors in tabulating wealth in cases of garbled names or where individuals moved between the 
dates of the census and the tax enumeration.  Since matches were sometimes ambiguous, a 
coding procedure was devised to rate the confidence of the match, with categories of exact 
match, nearly exact match, probable match, improbable match, and duplicate (two or more 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, nearly all the 1890 schedules were destroyed by fire.    5  
people with the same name).  The last two categories, which amounted to 2.1 to 4.1 per cent of 
the sample (depending upon census year), were omitted from calculations. 
  Property tax records matched with census manuscript schedules provide a valuable, new 
source to measure and analyze long-term trends in inequality.  There were strong incentives for 
accuracy in the tax assessment system: tax collectors sought to obtain all revenue permitted by 
law and property owners could appeal unfair assessments.  In our judgment, taxable wealth data 
are more reliable than the self-reported wealth data collected in the 1850, 1860, and 1870 
censuses.  The 1860 instructions to the enumerators concerning the reporting of personal 
property wealth state:  “Exact accuracy may not be arrived at, but all persons should be 
encouraged to give a near and prompt estimate for your information” (emphasis added).  The 
reported wealth levels are clustered on multiples of 100, indicating a strong tendency for 
rounding in the self-reports.  Timothy G. Conley and David W. Galenson have also pointed out 
that the census wealth data appear to be censored, but the point of censoring is uncertain and may 
have varied across enumerators.
11  
Richard Steckel uses scatter diagrams and regressions to compare census wealth with 
taxable wealth for the 1850, 1860, and 1870.
12  In the case of discrepancies, census wealth often 
exceeded taxable wealth, but the differences were not systematically associated with 
socioeconomic variables, such as occupation or age, that were reported by the census.
13  There 
are several plausible explanations for the differences, including assessments below market value, 
                                                 
11 Conley and Galenson, “Quantile Regression Analysis.” 
 
12 Steckel, “Census Manuscript Schedules.” 
 
13 Taxable wealth was systematically lower for widows, who received favorable tax treatment.     6  
exemptions, and inclusion of property owned by the spouse or children in census wealth.  Gini 
coefficients were larger in the tax records, but the differences were less than 0.06. 
  In this paper, we limit our analysis to the distribution of wealth across male household 
heads.
14  Table 1 provides economic and demographic characteristics of the samples.  The data in 
each sample have been weighted so that the share urban in the sample equals the share urban in 
the state for that census year.  During the sample period, the population became highly 
urbanized, with the share living in cities and towns increasing from 22.8 percent in 1820 to 89.0 
percent in 1910.  Over the century, the population aged, and the share of heads age 50 and older 
grew.   Reflecting the immigration of the period, the share of foreign-born increased between 
1850 and 1910.   The decline of farming in Massachusetts is evident in the compositional shift of 
the occupational structure away from agriculture.
15 
  The percent of the household heads without a match more than doubled between 1820 
and 1910 (from 34.2 percent to 73.6 percent), raising the question of whether match failures were 
caused by something other than growing inequality.  Perhaps fewer individuals were matched 
because migration rates increased or growth in city size complicated the maintenance of accurate 
records.  One test of this possibility is provided by data on the number of individuals assessed for 
                                                 
14 The taxable wealth of females, who comprised about 10 percent of the initial sample, will be 
studied in a separate paper. 
 
15 The characteristics and trends in characteristics of our sample are similar to those of the 
samples of household heads from the IPUMS data for Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode 
Island.  The trends observed for the samples of household heads mirror those observed in the 
IPUMS data for the adult male population and therefore reflect general  population changes 
rather than changes in the patterns of headship. Headship rates for all age groups except ages 70 
and older did decline slightly between 1850 and 1910, which means that our sample of 
household heads is likely slightly “more selective” in 1910 compared with 1850.  Since most 
adult males who were not household heads likely had little or no wealth, this implies that we may 
be understating the increase in inequality over the period. 
   7  
only the poll tax (a head tax) relative to the total number of polls assessed.  If slippage or 
disagreement between the census and the tax records was small, then this ratio should 
approximately equal the share of household heads not found in the tax records.  This is indeed 
the case.  The ratio of the number assessed for the poll tax only to total male polls assessed was 
67.2 percent in 1886, 70.8 per cent in 1890, 72.0 percent in 1900 and 77.9 percent in 1910.
16  
These levels and the trend approximately agree with those in Table 1 for the percent with no 
match near the turn of the century.   
Table 2 shows that the majority of wealth was held in real estate.  Over time, the very 
rich (top 1%) held a somewhat increasing share of their total wealth in this form, which raises the 
possibility that some financial wealth may have been omitted from the tax base.  According to 
Robert Lampman, estate tax data show that real estate declined as a share of total assets as 
wealth increased, and that in 1922 about 28 percent of economic estate (total gross estate minus 
debts, which is roughly comparable to taxable property in Massachusetts) was held in real 
estate.
17  On the other hand, the estate tax exemption in 1922 was $50,000, which confined the 
estate tax data to the very rich (about 1 percent of all deaths), a group likely to have held less 
wealth in real estate.  Although it would be desirable to compare our taxable wealth data with 
other measures of total assets in the late nineteenth century, it is apparent that any downward 
bias in measured inequality (arising from omitted financial wealth) cannot have been very large.  
The Gini coefficients (discussed in connection with Table 3) near the turn of the century were 
already extraordinarily high (about 0.90), and including any financial wealth that may have been 
omitted would only have made them greater.  In conclusion, we also note that if growth in 
                                                 
16 The results are taken from Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Aggregate of Polls. 
17 Lampman, Share, p. 158. 
   8  
financial wealth and its omission from the tax base was a problem, then our measures understate 
the extent, but not the direction of inequality change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 
 
Trends in Wealth Inequality, 1820 to 1910 
We use three measures of inequality to examine long-run changes in the distribution of 
wealth:  the shares of total wealth held by the top fractiles of the wealth distribution, the Gini 
coefficient, and the Theil entropy measure.   Previous research on historical wealth distributions 
has focused on the first two of these measures.  The shares of wealth held by the top 20 percent 
or the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution are straightforward and easy to calculate, but they 
do not capture the degree of dispersion within the top fractiles and ignore the lower fractiles of 
the wealth distribution.  The Gini coefficient is an index measure based on the average absolute 
difference in wealth levels between all pairs of individuals or households.  The Gini also has the 
more intuitive interpretation as twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal 
representing the case of “perfect equality” when all individuals have the same level of wealth.   
Like the Gini, the Theil entropy measure is an index measure based on the entire wealth 
distribution.   The Theil measure is given by the following equation: 

















where n represents the number of observations, wi represents the wealth of individual i, m 
represents the full sample mean wealth, and [0 ln(0)] is taken to be zero.
18  In the case of “perfect 
equality” when all individuals have the same level of wealth, the Theil measure, like the Gini, 
                                                 
18 Foster, “Inequality,” p. 55. 
   9  
equals zero.   In the case of “perfect inequality” when one individual owns all of the society’s 
wealth, the Theil measure equals [ln (n)].  Although this means that the maximum value of the 
Theil measure varies with sample size, the rapidly diminishing slope of the natural log function 
makes this of little practical importance for samples, such as ours, that are fairly large and 
approximately the same size.   
For all of the calculated inequality measures, we use bootstrap methods to estimate 
approximate standard errors, construct confidence intervals, and perform hypothesis tests.
19  For 
each sample of size n, we construct 1000 re-samples of size n by random draws with replacement 
from the original sample.   Following Mills and Zandvakili, we use the “percentile method” to 
construct confidence intervals, calculating tail probabilities directly from the bootstrapped 
distribution.
20   
  Table 3 reports the aggregate measures of wealth inequality for the samples of male 
household heads.  The three types of measures are highly correlated:  increases in the shares of 
wealth of the top 20, 5, and 1 percent of the wealth distribution correspond to increases in the 
Gini coefficient and the Theil entropy measure.  The correlation between the Gini and the Theil 
measure is 0.97.  The choice of inequality measure, therefore, has little impact on the observed 
trends in wealth inequality. 
  Figure 1 charts the Gini coefficients and Theil entropy measures.  The dashed lines 
represent the 95 percent confidence intervals constructed from bootstrap analysis.  Wealth 
                                                 
19 Asymptotic approximations of the variances of the Gini coefficient and the Theil entropy 
measure do exist, but little is known of their small sample properties.  Statistical inference based 
on bootstrap methods has been shown to be superior to asymptotic approximations both on 
theoretical grounds and in a variety of applications.   See Mills and Zandvakili, “Statistical 
Inference.” 
20 Mills and Zandvakili, “Statistical Inference.” 
   10  
inequality was substantially higher in Massachusetts in 1910 than it had been in 1820.  The rise 
in inequality, though, was not steady. Both the Gini and the Theil measure indicate that wealth 
inequality grew sharply between 1820 and 1850, leveled off between 1850 and 1870, and then 
began a steady increase to 1900. The increases in both measures between 1820 and 1850, and 
1870 and 1910 are statistically significant at the 5% level.
21  The data, therefore, reveal two 
periods of increasing inequality:  the four decades prior to the Civil War previously noted by 
Williamson and Lindert, and 1870 to 1910.   As seen in Table 3, during both of these periods, 
wealth became increasingly concentrated in the top fractiles of the wealth distribution.  The share 
of wealth held by the top 20 percent rose from 72 to 86 percent between 1820 and 1850 and from 
90 to 98 percent between 1870 and 1910. 
 
Decomposing the trends 
Decompositions of the Theil Entropy Measure 
To gain insights into the forces underlying the increases in inequality observed in Table 3 
and Figure 1, we consider the decompositions of the Theil entropy measure and its changes over 
time.  The additivity of the Theil measure allows it to be decomposed into components 
representing inequality arising from differences in wealth levels between population sub-groups 
and inequality arising from variation in wealth levels within those groups.  For any exhaustive 
collection of mutually exclusive subsets of observations labeled {1, 2,…G}, this measure can be 
re-written as follows: 
(2)  ￿ ￿



























                                                 
21 These tests were conducted by using bootstrap analysis to calculate approximate standard 
errors and confidence intervals for the difference between periods.     11  
where ng represents the number of observations in sub-group g, m g represents the mean wealth of 
sub-group g, and Tg represents the measure in equation (1) calculated for sub-group g.
22  The first 
term on the right hand side of equation (2) is the weighted sum of the Theil entropy measures for 
the sub-group wealth distributions where the weights are the sub-group shares of total wealth.  
This term represents the component of measured inequality due to inequality in the distribution 
of wealth within population sub-groups.  The second term is simply the Theil entropy measure of 
equation (1) calculated from a wealth distribution in which each person is assigned the mean 
wealth of their sub-group, and, therefore, represents the component of measured inequality due 
to inequality in the distribution of wealth between population sub-groups.
23 
  The decomposition of aggregate measured inequality into its within-group and between-
group components can provide important clues as to the sources of inequality in a society.  For 
instance, if a substantial fraction of aggregate inequality is due to inequality between occupation 
categories, this suggests that an important source of inequality is systematic variation in the 
returns to particular skills.    
More importantly, for the study of long-term trends in inequality, changes in the Theil 
entropy measure may be decomposed into three components:  (i) changes in the population 
                                                 
22 Foster, “Inequality,” p. 56.  Showing that the right-hand-side of equation (2) is equal to the 
right-hand-side of equation (1) is straightforward.  Note that the sub-group level Theil measure, 

























To derive equation (1), simply substitute this expression into (2) and rearrange terms so that the 
summations are over i=1…n instead of g=1,… G.   
 
23 The Theil entropy measure is a member of the Generalized entropy class of measures.  Cowell 
and Kuga, “Additivity,” and Cowell, “The Structure,”  have shown that only measures in this 
class satisfy a set of axioms considered desirable in inequality measures:  a weak principle of 
transfers, general decomposability, and complete scale invariance.   12  
shares of sub-groups (ng/n); (ii) changes in the relative mean wealth of subgroups (m g/m); and (iii) 
changes in the dispersion of wealth within subgroups (Tg).    The contributions of each of these 
elements can be calculated as follows: 
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This decomposition provides important insights into the sources of change and allows us to 
evaluate some of the proposed explanations of rising inequality trends in the nineteenth century 
to which we now turn.   
 
Proposed Explanations and Their Testable Implications 
Suggested explanations of rising inequality in the nineteenth century can be grouped into 
four categories: composition effects, structural shift, labor market changes, and the rise of life-
cycle behavior.  We give a brief synopsis of important hypotheses within each category and 
discuss their testable implications. 
The most straightforward hypotheses attribute changes in inequality to changes in the 
composition of the population.  In his well-know article linking rising inequality with 
industrialization, Simon Kuznets suggested that urbanization contributed to the process because 
inequality was greater in urban compared with rural areas.
24   Immigration may have acted on 
                                                 
24 Kuznets, “Economic Growth,” pp. 7-8.   13  
inequality in much the same way as urbanization.  Immigrants were poor relative to the native 
born and the share of immigrants in the total population rose in two waves:  the 1830s to the 
1850s and from the 1860s to the early twentieth century.
25  These waves coincide with spurts of 
inequality growth found in our data. 
  Another explanation of changes in inequality in the nineteenth century focuses on the 
changes in the population age structure.  Age is an important determinant of wealth.  Studies for 
the nineteenth century show that wealth tended to peak for people in the mid or late 50s.  Given 
this phenomenon, Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman have noted that wealth would be more 
unequally distributed in a society skewed toward younger ages.
26  Given the decline in fertility in 
the nineteenth century and its impact on raising the average age of the population, however, this 
hypothesis cannot explain the rise in inequality we observe in the Massachusetts data.  Yet, it is 
relevant to contemplate ways that the aging of the population could have dampened the effects of 
other forces leading to inequality.   
  More interesting theories of increasing inequality in the nineteenth century propose 
widening gaps between population subgroups.  Kuznets suggested that the gap between 
agricultural and industrial workers may have grown.  Since the income elasticity of demand for 
food is less than one, economic growth is presumed to induce a rise in the demand for industrial 
products and services and a decline in the demand for food.  This structural shift leads to 
stagnating wages in agriculture relative to the other sectors, which contributes to rising inequality 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
25 See Williamson and Lindert, American Inequality, p. 209. 
 
26 Atack and Bateman, “Egalitarianism.” 
   14  
over time.
27  This explanation also suggests a widening gap between rural and urban wealth.  If 
correct, much of the rise in the Theil measure of inequality should be attributable to greater 
inequality between the agricultural and non-agricultural subgroups and between the urban and 
rural population.  
  Several investigators have argued that the skill-premium rose during the nineteenth 
century.  Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson suggest this followed from capital accumulation 
and biased technological change, which increased the demand for skilled relative to unskilled 
labor and led to “wage stretching” or a widening in gap in pay.
28  Waves of immigration also 
increased the supply of unskilled relative to skilled labor, and may have depressed the wages of 
the unskilled relative to the skilled.  In his “frontier thesis,” Frederick Jackson Turner argued that 
the west acted as a safety valve that absorbed large quantities of unskilled labor originating in the 
east, which buoyed wages of the unskilled in eastern labor markets.  When the frontier closed 
near the end of the nineteenth century, unskilled eastern workers lost any earnings advantage 
conveyed by this safety valve.  All three of these mechanisms have the same testable 
implications for the decomposition of changes in the Theil inequality measure.  Namely, they all 
predict a rise in between group inequality when the wealth holders are organized by occupations. 
Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch have proposed a very different mechanism of change.  
They argue that growing inequality in the nineteenth century was the result of new life-cycle 
patterns of wealth accumulation that were connected to declines in fertility.
29  In their view, the 
initiators of change were children who moved West and defaulted on obligations to provide old-
                                                 
27 Kuznets, “Economic Growth,” pp. 7-8. 
 
28 Lindert and Williamson, American Inequality. 
 
29 Ransom and Sutch, “Two Strategies;” Sutch, “All Things Reconsidered.”   15  
age care for their parents.  This behavior led subsequent generations of parents to have fewer 
children and instead accumulate more wealth, which was then spent on old-age care in lieu of 
direct support by their children.  These changes in behavior led to a growing concentration of 
wealth by age.  Specifically, other things being equal, the mean wealth of household heads in 




Table 4 presents the decompositions of the changes in the Theil entropy measure from 
1820 to 1850 and 1870 to 1910 – the two periods of increasing inequality.  These data indicate 
that the increasing inequality was due to both shifts in population shares and increases in within-
group inequality. 
Just as Kuznets proposed, the shift of the population into urban areas led to greater 
inequality.  Between 1820 and 1850, the urban population in Massachusetts rose from less than a 
quarter to half of the state’s population.  This change alone would have led to a greater than 50 
percent increase in measured inequality, holding inequality within and between urban and rural 
populations unchanged.  Likewise, the rise in the urban population from 67 to 89 percent 
between 1870 and 1910 accounts for a 22 percent rise in aggregate inequality. 
The shift of the population out of agricultural occupations between 1870 and 1910, which 
was strongly related to the process of urbanization, also can account for a substantial increase in 
inequality.  In fact, had inequality between and within occupation groups been unchanged 
between 1870 and 1910, measured inequality would have increased by 41 percent just because of 
changes in the occupational distribution of household heads in Massachusetts.   16  
The other composition effects were small.  As expected, the aging of the population did 
have a slight negative effect on aggregate inequality.   Surprisingly, however, the increase in the 
foreign-born population also had a negative effect on aggregate inequality. 
While the composition hypotheses of changing inequality find support in Table 4, the 
hypotheses predicting widening gaps between groups do not.  In fact, the data indicate that 
wealth gaps between occupation groups and between the urban and rural populations were 
decreasing rather than increasing.  The prominence of the hypotheses predicting growing 
disparities between groups motivated us to test these results further by estimating tobit 
regressions for the log of wealth for the years 1850, 1870, and 1910.   The explanatory variables 
included in these regressions are indicators of age, urban residence, race, nativity, illiteracy, and 
occupation.
30  Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients and the predicted effects on observed 
wealth.  The predicted effects were calculated as the ratio of the expected observed wealth of 
individuals with a particular characteristic to the expected observed wealth of the baseline 
individual.
31   So for instance, the predicted effect reported for the 30 to 39 year-old age group in 
1870 is 3.730.  This indicates that controlling for other factors, the wealth of males age 30 to 39 
was almost 4 times that of males 20 to 29. 
The data in Table 5 indicate that inequality between age groups did not increase between 
1870 and 1910.  The data in Table 5, in fact, indicate that differences in wealth levels between 
age groups fell between 1870 and 1910.  But differences in wealth levels between age groups did 
                                                 
30 The dependent variable was defined as: ln(wealth + $1). 
31 The expected observed wealth of different groups are calculated using the following formula: 
       
      E[ln(wi + 1)] = Fi(xi¢b/s) xi¢b + sfi(xi¢b/s)  
   17  
grow between 1850 and 1870, even though aggregate inequality during this period was fairly 
stable.  Between age-group differentials were also larger in 1910 than in 1850.  However, the 
changes in these differentials are not consistent with the predictions of Ransom and Sutch’s 
hypothesis.  Although all groups gained relative to the baseline group of 20 to 29 year olds, the 
biggest gains were made by males in their 60s and above, the group that Ransom and Sutch’s 
hypothesis predicts should have been spending their accumulated assets.  The gains made by 
men in their 40s and 50s were fairly small. 
The results regarding occupation differences in wealth are also intriguing.  Table 5 
indicates that these differences were not only not growing between 1850 and 1910, but, for the 
most part, were falling over this period.  The relative wealth of white collar workers fell 
substantially between 1850 and 1910.  By 1910, farmers had overtaken white collar workers as 
the group with the highest mean wealth.   More interesting given the hypotheses predicting 
wage-stretching during this period, the gap between the skilled and the unskilled also fell 
substantially.  In 1850, the predicted ratio of skilled to unskilled workers wealth was over 3; by 
1910, the predicted ratio was only 1.35. 
  These findings indicate that wage-stretching was not a factor in the rise in wealth 
inequality in the late-nineteenth century.  The gap between the wealth of the unskilled and the 
wealth of the skilled was shrinking rather than expanding during this period.  This seems at odds 
with the data on wages during this period assembled by Williamson and Lindert.
32  These data 
indicate that the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages was growing at an annual rate of 0.3 percent 
for the period 1869-1899 and 1 percent for the period 1899-1909.  The two sets of findings can, 
                                                                                                                                                             
where fi(￿) and Fi(￿) represent the density function and cumulative distibution function of the 
standard normal distribution. 
32 Williamson and Lindert, American Inequality, p. 218.   18  
however, be reconciled.  Wages are only one determinant of wealth.  An individual’s wealth 
holdings at any given point in time reflect the cumulative effects of inheritance, past and current 
labor earnings, savings rates, portfolio choice, and returns on assets.  Wage inequality clearly has 
an impact on the distribution of wealth, but wage inequality and wealth inequality need not 
always exhibit the same trends and patterns.  The wealth data for Massachusetts indicate that 
even if the wage gap between the unskilled and skilled was growing at the end of the nineteenth 
century, other factors were leading the wealth gap between these groups to fall. 
  While inequality did not increase between groups, the final column of Table 4 reveals 
that inequality did increase within groups.  Figure 2 charts the group-level Theil measures for all 
the decompositions.  Inequality within urban areas increased substantially, particularly in the 
antebellum period.  Clearly, as the urban population grew, it became more diverse.   The native-
born population also experienced increasing inequality in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century.   At the same time, wealth inequality within the foreign population declined.  In 1850, 
the Theil measure for the foreign-born population was almost three times that for the native-born 
population.  By 1910, the Theil measure for the foreign-born population was less than ten 
percent higher than that for the native-born population.   The data on the inequality within 
different age groups also reveal interesting trends.  The groups experiencing the greatest 
increases in inequality during the period were the 50 to 59 and 60 to 69 year-old age groups.   
Inequality was also increasing between 1870 and 1910 for all occupation groups except farmers.  
For the unskilled, the rise in inequality between 1870 and 1910 was a reversal of a decline in 
inequality between 1850 and 1870.  Wealth inequality for the unskilled in 1910 was still   19  
somewhat below that observed in 1850.  But for skilled and white collar workers, wealth 
inequality in 1910 was substantially higher than in 1850.
33 
  The finding of increasing inequality within groups remains even when considering more 
narrowly-defined population groups.  The bottom of Table 4 presents decompositions in which 
population sub-groups are defined by pairs of characteristics such as urban/rural residence and 
nativity, and age-group and occupation.  Even using these more narrowly defined sub-groups, we 
find that within-group inequality was increasing between 1870 and 1910. 
  The increases in within group inequality are an interesting phenomenon, which have not 
been anticipated by any of the major hypotheses for growing inequality during the nineteenth 
century.  Since economists have considerable evidence indicating that labor markets were 
reasonably well integrated by the second half of the nineteenth century, within regions such as 
New England, it is reasonable to believe that competition would have approximately equalized 
wages within occupations.
34  If correct, one must look to beyond wages to other powerful forces 
that affected wealth ownership.  Conceivably, unemployment rates could be a candidate that 
affected earnings and therefore wealth.  Much of the rising inequality, however, occurred 
through growing concentration of wealth near the upper end of the wealth distribution--at levels 
of wealth ownership only modestly affected by labor market earnings.  As shown in Table 3, 
between 1820 and 1910 the share of wealth held by the top 20 percent of the wealth distribution 
increased from 72 to 98 percent and the share held by the top 1 percent increased from 20 to 35 
                                                 
33We also performed decompositions using more disaggregated occupation categories:  
professional, business, other white collar, skilled, semi-skilled, and farmers.  The qualitative 
results were the same: inequality within occupation groups was increasing between 1870 and 
1910 even while inequality between groups was decreasing. 
34 Atack, Bateman and Margo, “Rising Wage” report an increase in the dispersion of unskilled 
wages between 1860 and 1880, but most of this is accounted for by the gap between north and 
south, as opposed to dispersion within the north.   20  
percent.  Variations in rates of returns on widely held assets such as land seem like an attractive 
hypothesis for study.  Spectacularly high returns on some entrepreneurial activities, a central 
feature of the Gilded Age, also holds promise. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
  This paper assembles new data and new methods of analysis for studying wealth 
inequality trends in industrializing America.  Records of household heads from the census 
matched with real and personal property tax records for Massachusetts reveal that the Gini 
coefficient and the Theil entropy measure of inequality were highly correlated.  The Theil 
measure approximately doubled over the period from 1820 to 1910, a gain that was divided 
about evenly between the antebellum and the postbellum periods.  A surge between 1870 and 
1900 dominated the growth in inequality following the Civil War. 
  We test several popular hypotheses for inequality growth using decompositions of the 
Theil inequality measure and tobit regressions.  The most successful hypothesis was put forward 
by Kuznets regarding composition effects.  Population redistribution to urban areas alone would 
have led to a 53 percent increase in the Theil measure from 1820 to 1850 and a 22 percent 
increase from 1870 to 1910, holding inequality between and within urban and rural areas 
unchanged.  Proposed labor market explanations, including sectoral shift (that led to higher 
wages in non-agricultural relative to agricultural sectors), biased technological change, and 
immigration are inconsistent with the fact that inequality between occupational groups was 
declining in the last decades of the century.  Wealth accumulation patterns by age are also 
inconsistent with the hypothesis of child default on responsibilities for old age care, at least 
during the second half of the nineteenth century.  To the extent that age patterns of wealth   21  
ownership changed after 1850, relatively more wealth accumulated at very old ages as opposed 
to the 30s and 40s when parents would have amassed assets other than children in planning 
retirement. 
  None of the popular explanations of rising inequality in the nineteenth century can 
explain the rising inequality within groups that we find.  Therefore, it is worth investing 
resources to develop an alternative hypothesis that may account for the salient facts.  We are led 
to propose a new mechanism based on luck, rents, and entrepreneurship, which might explain the 
growing heterogeneity within occupations and within rural and urban areas.  Any explanation 
must also incorporate the important role of real estate in total taxable wealth (about 70 percent), 
and the growing share this type of asset assumed in the portfolios of the very rich.  A quote 
attributed to John Jacob Astor, made shortly before his death in 1848, is inspiring in this regard:  
“Could I begin life again, knowing what I now know, and had money to invest, I would buy 
every foot of land on the island of Manhattan.”
35  If a shrewd investor such as Astor was 
surprised by the vast returns to be made on real estate, surely large numbers of ordinary citizens 
were unable to judge as well.  Many nineteenth-century Americans played the real estate game, 
which took on the dimensions of a repeated lottery whose outcomes were driven by 
unpredictable factors such as immigration and the precise routes taken by transportation systems.  
New entrepreneurial opportunities also appeared in America’s industrializing economy, with vast 
sums wagered, won, and lost in developing new industries such as railroads, oil, steel, and 
finance, which signify the Gilded Age. 
  Longitudinal data on wealth may be useful in testing at least some of the predictions of 
this hypothesis.  Linked household data has already been assembled for the period 1850 to 1860 
                                                 
35 Jackson, Encyclopedia, p. 63.    22  
by Richard Steckel and by Joseph Ferrie.
36  These data were created from census schedules and 
include the data on wealth collected in those census years.  Similar longitudinal data may be 
created for the late-nineteenth century using census schedules and property tax records.  These 
data can be used to construct wealth transition matrices which describe the degree of wealth 
mobility in the two periods.  If the hypothesis is correct, we should observe greater wealth 
mobility in the later period, and this greater mobility should remain even when controlling for 
occupation, size of place, age, and nativity. 
                                                 
36 Steckel, “Census Matching,” and Ferrie, Yankeys Now.   23  
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Table 1.—Descriptive Statistics 
 
  1820  1830  1840  1850  1860  1870  1880  1900  1910 
                    Urban  22.8%  31.1%  37.9%  50.6%  59.5%  66.7%  74.7%  86.0%  89.0% 
Age of head                   
      < 20        0.2  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.1 
     20 -29        14.9  14.7  13.9  11.5  12.9  13.5 
     30 - 39        32.2  32.4  27.2  27.0  29.1  29.4 
     40 - 49        25.8  23.3  25.0  25.8  22.0  25.8 
     50 - 59        14.3  16.2  19.8  17.2  17.3  17.8 
     60 - 69        8.5  9.4  9.2  11.9  12.0  8.4 
     70 +        4.0  3.9  4.6  6.2  6.1  5.0 
Black        0.8  1.1  1.1  1.2  2.1  2.1 
Foreign-born        24.5  29.8  39.6  42.1  45.6  42.8 
Illiterate        4.8  5.3  7.7  8.1  5.6  6.1 
Occupation of head                   
     Farmers        23.0  16.1  11.6  9.3  8.5  4.9 
     White collar        15.4  17.5  18.9  21.3  29.4  32.5 
     Skilled        26.9  33.3  28.2  27.4  22.9  23.0 
     Unskilled        29.7  29.6  37.5  34.4  32.9  32.3 
     Other           5.0  3.6  3.8  7.6  6.3  7.4 
                    No match in tax                   
      records  34.2  34.1  37.7  51.2  54.7  58.2  66.2  70.1  73.6 
                    No. of Observations  1016  989  977  1023  1005  1017  1020  977  1003 
                     
Note:  Rural and urban observations were weighted by the rural and urban population shares in 
the state. 
 
Table 2.—Share of Real Estate Wealth in Total Taxable Wealth, Male Household Heads, 
Massachusetts, 1820-1910 
 
  Sample  Average real estate share for individuals in: 
  Aggregate  Top 20%  Top 5%  Top 1% 
          1820  76.9%  79.1%  62.7%  36.8% 
1830  66.5  75.1  58.6  32.1 
1840  75.4  78.8  75.8  55.3 
1850  64.6  75.8  72.1  56.5 
1860  55.5  71.7  50.8  29.0 
1870  51.7  62.3  48.2  35.5 
1880  73.3  82.7  66.2  62.9 
1900  71.9  78.4  76.7  64.9 
1910  68.7  74.8  71.3  70.0 
             30  
Table 3.—Distribution of Total Taxable Wealth, Male Household Heads,  
Massachusetts, 1820-1910 
 
    Share of Wealth held by:    Theil 
  N  Top 20%  Top 5%  Top 1%  Gini  Entropy 
             
1820  1016  72.0%  40.5%  20.3%  0.720  1.125 
    (1.7%)  (2.7%)  (2.8%)  (0.015)  (0.086) 
1830  989  77.6  49.2  28.9  0.775  1.486 
    (2.2)  (4.5)  (5.3)  (0.020)  (0.175) 
1840  977  78.3  45.0  20.0  0.771  1.282 
    (1.6)  (2.8)  (2.4)  (0.013)  (0.072) 
1850  1023  85.8  55.7  33.4  0.836  1.761 
    (1.7)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (0.016)  (0.147) 
1860  1005  88.1  55.7  27.0  0.844  1.679 
    (1.4)  (3.5)  (3.2)  (0.012)  (0.096) 
1870  1017  90.1  56.7  27.2  0.856  1.730 
    (1.2)  (3.3)  (2.9)  (0.011)  (0.086) 
1880  1020  93.7  60.3  29.1  0.877  1.924 
    (1.2)  (4.1)  (5.0)  (0.012)  (0.136) 
1900  977  97.3  70.5  37.2  0.911  2.264 
    (0.9)  (4.0)  (5.6)  (0.011)  (0.157) 
1910  1003  98.3  68.7  35.0  0.910  2.207 
    (0.8)  (3.8)  (4.6)  (0.010)  (0.124) 
             
 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are approximate standard errors obtained by bootstrapping.   31  
Table 4.—Decompositions of Changes in Theil Entropy Measure 
 











          1820-1850  56.5%       
     Urban/rural    53.4%  -29.2%  32.3% 
         
1870-1910  27.6       
     Urban/rural    21.9  -5.5  11.2 
         
     Nativity    -5.5  2.5  30.6 
         
     Age     -5.5  12.4  20.8 
         
     Occupation    41.4  -40.0  26.1 
               
     Urban/Rural &:         
           Nativity    25.0  -14.6  17.2 
         
           Age    29.2  -9.5  7.9 
         
           Occupation    54.7  -47.5  20.4 
         
      Nativity &:         
           Age    -22.3  29.4  20.5 
         
           Occupation    31.6  -28.6  24.6 
         
      Age & Occupation        38.8  -31.3  20.1 
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Table 5.—Tobit Regression Results for Log Wealth, 1850, 1870 and 1910 
 
  1850  1870  1910 
   
Coefficients 
Predicted ratio of group 
wealth to base wealth  
 
Coefficients 
Predicted ratio of group 
wealth to base wealth  
 
Coefficients 
Predicted ratio of group 
wealth to base wealth  
Age of head             
      < 20  -33.377  0.164  -36.460  0.390  0.333  1.041 
  (22085)    (23465)    (11.645)   
     30 - 39  0.865  1.514  3.784  3.730  4.219  2.110 
  (0.679)    (1.149)    (1.831)   
     40 - 49  3.145  5.872  5.678  9.922  7.734  6.443 
  (0.686)    (1.147)    (1.832)   
     50 - 59  2.812  4.708  6.992  22.223  7.078  5.026 
  (0.767)    (1.173)    (1.898)   
     60 - 69  2.396  3.611  7.352  28.213  8.087  7.427 
  (0.881)    (1.344)    (2.149)   
     70 +  3.581  7.932  7.641  34.345  12.106  56.412 
  (1.136)    (1.631)    (2.423)   
Occ. of head             
     Farmers  3.980  10.554  4.719  5.880  8.748  9.838 
  (0.660)    (1.011)    (1.892)   
     White collar  5.175  26.278  4.982  6.749  7.666  6.273 
  (0.683)    (0.866)    (1.205)   
     Skilled  2.200  3.199  1.498  1.529  2.094  1.353 
  (0.608)    (0.795)    (1.309)   
     Other     1.564  2.204  3.606  3.440  4.340  2.174 
  (1.073)    (1.534)    (1.828)   
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Table 5.—Continued. 
 
  1850  1870  1910 
   
Coefficients 
Predicted ratio of group 
wealth to base wealth  
 
Coefficients 
Predicted ratio of group 
wealth to base wealth  
 
Coefficients 
Predicted ratio of group 
wealth to base wealth  
Urban  -2.872  0.370  -2.840  0.593  -5.447  0.687 
  (0.493)    (0.708)    (1.331)   
Black  -0.995  0.664  -5.437  0.466  -2.809  0.779 
  (2.490)    (3.908)    (3.911)   
Foreign-born  -4.957  0.246  -2.701  0.604  -0.313  0.965 
  (0.698)    (0.714)    (0.941)   
Illiterate  -2.968  0.361  -0.477  0.894  -2.809  0.779 
  (1.747)    (1.287)    (2.172)   
             
Intercept  -0.710    -4.460    -10.001   
  (0.753)    (1.229)    (2.214)   
             
Scale (s)  5.372    6.471    8.423   
  (0.197)    (0.305)    (0.512)   
             
No. of  Obs.      1017    1003   
             
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is ln(wealth + $1).  The expected observed wealth of different groups used to construct the predicted 
wealth ratios were calculated using the following formula: 
       
      E[ln(wi + 1)] = Fi(xi¢b/s) xi¢b + sfi(xi¢b/s)  
 
where fi(￿) and Fi(￿) represent the density function and cumulative distibution function of the standard normal distribution. 
 
 